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FUKUSHIMA: CATASTROPHE, COMPENSATION,
AND JUSTICE IN JAPAN
Eric A. Feldman*
INTRODUCTION
I am honored to take part in this year's Clifford Symposium and
celebrate the extraordinary breadth and depth of Marc Galanter's
scholarship. So often when I begin to explore a new research area, I
discover that Marc has been there, sometimes decades earlier. There-
fore, it was no surprise to find that Marc's work on access to justice
raises many of the issues that I am now confronting as I examine the
natural and nuclear disaster in Fukushima, Japan, and the effort by
the victims to obtain compensation for their harms.'
Well before the Fukushima disaster of March 11, 2011, governments
in the developed world struggled with victim compensation in cases of
environmental contamination, harms caused by pharmaceutical prod-
ucts, terrorist attacks, and more.2 All of those are important prece-
dents to Fukushima, but none of them approach the breadth of harms
resulting from the triple disaster of huge earthquake, massive tsunami,
and nuclear meltdown now known in Japan as 3/11. With close to
20,000 people dead or missing, one million homes fully destroyed or
seriously damaged, and 100,000 people displaced, getting those whose
lives were affected by the events in Fukushima back on their feet is a
* Eric A. Feldman is a Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. The
research and writing of this Article were supported by a University of Pennsylvania Law School
Summer Research Grant. I am grateful to Masayuki Murayama for inviting me to participate in
his project "Problems of Law in Response to Disasters," which inspired this Article, and to
Kenneth Feinberg, for talking with me about disaster compensation in the United States.
1. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Lim-
its of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REv. 95, 98, 100 (1974); Marc Galanter, Adjudication,
Litigation, and Related Phenomena, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 151, 228-29 (Leon Lip-
son & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986) (addressing the tensions between different forms of dispute
processing (like litigation and mediation); discussing how and why bigger and wealthier parties
are advantaged in legal conflicts; and looking broadly at the link between the institutional struc-
ture of disputing, the nature of parties engaged in disputes, and the outcome of disputes).
2. See, e.g., Eric A. Feldman & Ronald Bayer, Introduction: Understanding the Blood Feuds,
in BLOOD FEUDS: AIDS, BLOOD, AND THE POLITICS OF MEDICAL DISASTER 1, 4 (Eric A. Feld-
man & Ronald Bayer eds., 1999) [hereinafter BLOOD FEUDS]; Eric A. Feldman, Blood Justice:
Courts, Conflict, and Compensation in Japan, France, and the United States, 34 LAW & Soc'Y
REv. 651 (2000).
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daunting task.. How should Japanese society, and the Japanese state,
respond? How much compensation, if any, should be offered to the
victims? What types of losses should be considered compensable?
Which institutions are best equipped to evaluate and manage a system
of redress?
II. DISASTER COMPENSATION IN JAPAN: THE PAST
In both industrialized and developing nations, historically and cur-
rently, accident victims are generally expected to bear the cost of their
harms.3 In the oft-quoted language of Oliver Wendell Holmes, "[T]he
general principle of our law is that loss from accident must lie where it
falls."'4 That principle has also guided how governments approach dis-
aster victim compensation. The tendency to stand back and let victims
manage on their own is well illustrated by the United States, with its
tradition of individualism, deep antagonism to paternalism, and lack
of interest in European ideas of social solidarity.5 When disasters
strike, as they often do, the state (both national and local) has little
inclination to offer financial compensation. From Hurricane Katrina
to the U.S.S. Cole, Americans whose lives were crushed by disaster
have been left to take care of themselves, even when in many cases
they were unable to do so.
Yet, in a number of highly visible cases, a mix of government aid
and private largesse has been offered to disaster victims in the United
States. The 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund is perhaps the most nota-
ble example of the government articulating a vision of disaster com-
pensation as a display of national solidarity. It is joined by other
disasters-the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and the Virginia Tech
shootings, for example-that also triggered the creation of compensa-
tion mechanisms. Compensation in these cases has been justified in a
number of ways-as a moral imperative to aid victims, an economic
imperative to shield corporations from potentially crippling liability,
and a political imperative to heal public and private wounds. 6
3. There are, of course, some exceptions, like the no fault medical liability system in Sweden.
See Jerome Harleston, No-Fault Medical Liability Compensation System, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY
(Apr. 16, 2003), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/olrdata/ins/rptl2003-R-0386.htm.
4. 0. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 94 (1881).
5. See, e.g., 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 120 (Henry Reeve trans.,
1862) ("[Americans] owe nothing to any man, they expect nothing from any man; they acquire
the habit of always considering themselves as standing alone, and they are apt to imagine that
their whole destiny is in their own hands.").
6. See KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?: THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO
COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11, at 42 (2005).
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The disaster in Fukushima could have been the Japanese govern-
ment's 9/11 moment-an opportunity to offer compensation to victims
as a symbol of national unity in a time of crisis, to help economically
challenged victims, and to support the nuclear power industry. Doing
so would have underscored the emphasis on social bonds, or kizuna,
which was so heavily promoted by the government in the wake of the
Fukushima disaster.7 It would also appear to complement a number
of long-standing Japanese norms and practices: a legacy of central
government control of the policy agenda, a history of state entangle-
ment in the lives of citizens, an emphasis on national values (and over-
emphasis, at least in some circumstances, on nationalism), and a desire
to communicate to the public that the success of individuals and the
success of the nation are inseparable. 8 If ever there was a time for a
nation seen increasingly as a marginal global player to pull together,
and for the central government to use a national tragedy to rebind the
fraying ties of a country suffering from two decades of economic mal-
aise, Fukushima was it.
Yet, the destruction in Fukushima did not spark a moral or political
discussion about whether victims of mass tragedies should benefit
from government action to compensate. Instead, in apparent defiance
of a number of background conditions that make disaster compensa-
tion seem like a plausible option in Japan, the response to Fukushima
underscored the absence of a compensation norm. Indeed, one is
hard pressed to find examples in which the state has compensated be-
cause it believes that compensation is the "right" thing to do or is
essential to some notion of solidarity; compensation schemes justified
on political or economic grounds are also rare.
The history of natural disasters in Japan reveals little appetite for
compensation. In 1959, for example, the Isewan Typhoon, one of the
worst natural disasters in Japan's history, killed over 5,000 people, in-
jured more than 40,000, and destroyed 120,000 homes.9 The govern-
ment mounted a major reconstruction effort, but did not offer any
monetary compensation for death, injury, or property damage. Like-
wise, the 1993 earthquake in Okushiri, a small island near Hokkaido,
was the largest in twenty-five years, causing a tsunami with waves of
7. Japanese public opinion surveys found that the kanji (written character) for kizuna
summed up 2011. Japanese Public Chooses 'Kizuna' as Kanji of 2011, BBC NEWS (Dec. 23,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16321999.
8. Masao Maruyama, The Logic and Psychology of Ultranationalism, in THOUGHT AND BE-
HAVIOR IN MODERN JAPANESE POLITICS 1, 6 (Ivan Morris ed., 1963).
9. JAPAN WATER FORUM, TYPHOON ISEWAN (VER) AND ITS LESSONS (2005), available at
http://www.waterforum.jp/jpn/katrina/Typhoon-Isewan.pdf.
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ten to thirty meters.' 0 Almost two hundred people were killed, and
70% of homes on the island were destroyed. Despite the discrete geo-
graphical scope of the damage and the relatively limited number of
victims, no government compensation was offered and victims re-
ceived only small private donations allocated by the local government.
The most deadly earthquake of the postwar era was the 1995 Han-
shin (Kobe) earthquake, which was responsible for over 6,000 deaths,
40,000 injuries, and almost 400,000 destroyed homes. 1 The fact that it
was an election year may explain why the government invested heav-
ily in infrastructure reconstruction. 12 Those who suffered personal in-
jury or property loss, however, received little aid beyond a charity
payment of approximately $2,500 per family from the Japanese Red
Cross and a small condolence payment (mimaikin) authorized by the
Japan Legislature (Diet) as part of the reconstruction budget.' 3
Compensation is no more forthcoming in other types of major acci-
dents or disasters. Flood victims, for example, are not compensated
for their losses, even in extraordinary circumstances, nor are those
who are harmed by environmental pollution or who suffer iatrogenic
injuries, as the Minamata mercury pollution case and the HIV-tainted
blood case demonstrate. 14 In both of those cases, at least some vic-
tims were ultimately paid, but not without the government denying or
10. Masayuki Nakao, Okushiri Tsunami Generated by Southwest-off Hokkaido Earthquake,
HATAMURA INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY, http://www.sozogaku.coml
fkd/en/cfen/CA1000618.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
11. DAVID W. EDGINGTON, RECONSTRUCTING KOBE: THE GEOGRAPHY OF CRISIS AND OP-
PORTUNITY 236 (2010).
12. See id. at 85-86 ("For some commentators, the reasons [for Japan's expenditures on infra-
structure] had to do with the fact that 1995 was an election year in Japan. The ruling Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP), then in a coalition with the Japan Socialist Party, felt that it would gain
politically by providing subsidies to the Kobe region .... ).
13. Condolence payments (mimaikin) are clearly distinguished from compensation because
they are given as an expression of sympathy rather than an effort to make the victim whole. For
Kobe earthquake victims, the payments were five million yen to families that lost the head of
household, and 2.5 million yen for those who lost a family member. The exchange rate of U.S.
dollars to yen (as of February 17, 2013) is approximately 1:93. Currencies Center, YAHOO! FI-
NANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/currency-converter (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
14. See, e.g., FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 30-34 (1987)
("The explicit characterization of the payments as mimaikin is further evidence of the company's
close attention to the legal nature of the agreement and its determination to use legal doctrine to
prevent continuing liability. Under the agreement [the company] does no more than express
sympathy for the victims, who, in turn, forfeit all legal rights to compensation."); Feldman, supra
note 2, at 60, 69 (describing the struggle that hemophiliacs and others who had been affected by
HIV-tainted blood in Japan went through to obtain compensation for their suffering, and noting
that, even after the compensation system was established, the government "steadfastly denied its
responsibility for infecting hemophiliacs"; it was only after years of litigation that the
hemophiliacs obtained large cash settlements and an apology from the government and pharma-
ceutical companies involved).
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obscuring its responsibility and the victims engaging in protracted le-
gal struggles. If some form of disaster insurance was the norm, it
might explain the state's blanket refusal to compensate, but earth-
quake insurance is relatively rare and insurance against most other
ty\-es of disasters is unavailable.
Although the Japanese government rarely, if ever, offers compensa-
tion to victims of natural disasters, one might expect victims of terror-
ism to receive more generous treatment. Japan has experienced two
potentially compensable terrorist events. One occurred in 1995, when
the cult Aum Shinrikyo released highly toxic sarin nerve gas into the
Tokyo subway system, killing twelve people, seriously injuring dozens
more, and exposing approximately 5,500.15 In the absence of state ac-
tion, victims successfully sued Aum, but the cult was only able to sat-
isfy 1.5 billion yen of the court's 3.8 billion yen judgment.16 The
victims then turned to the state to fill the gap, triggering a political
debate over the state's responsibility to the victims. The Diet ulti-
mately passed legislation enabling the government to supplement
Aum's payments, but rejected a proposal that it authorize government
compensation for future victims of terrorism.1 7
The second terrorist act involved the abduction of Japanese nation-
als by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s, in what appears to have
been an unorthodox effort to improve North Korea's intelligence and
surveillance system. 18 In 2002, what had long been unsubstantiated
allegations of abduction were confirmed by the North Korean govern-
ment, which issued an apology to the Japanese government and con-
firmed that five abductees were still alive. The five were repatriated
and the Diet passed the Abductee's Support Law, which provides a
monthly allowance of 170,000 yen per repatriated abductee, 240,000
yen per two-person household, and an additional 30,000 yen for each
15. See Manabu Watanabe, Religion and Violence in Japan Today: A Chronological and Doc-
trinal Analysis of Aua Shinrikyo, 10 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 80, 80-81 (1998).
16. See Jun Hongo, Aum's Bankruptcy Proceedings to End 13 Years On, JAPAN TIMES (March
20, 2008), http://info.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20080320a6.html.
17. Toshimitsu Miyai, Aum Compensation Unresolved, DAILY YOMIURI, June 17,2008, availa-
ble at http://www.religionnewsblog.com/21650/aum-compensation-unresolved.
18. See generally Richard J. Samuels, Kidnapping Politics in East Asia, 10 J. E. ASIAN STUD.
363, 367 (2010) (describing the abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korea and the response
of the Japanese government); Celeste Arrington, Interest Group Influence in Policy-Making
Processes: Comparing the Abductions Issue and North Korea Policy in Japan and South Korea 3
(Aug. 30-Sept. 2, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://citation.allacademic.com/
meta/p-mla.apa-research citation/2/0/9/6/4/pages209641/p209641-1.php.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
family member. 19 The Japanese government also made the repatri-
ated abductees eligible for full pension benefits.
Both the victims of the sarin nerve gas attack and the five repatri-
ated abductees benefitted from government legislation that provided
them with compensation, and as such, they can be seen as exceptions
to the general norm in Japan of leaving disaster victims to fend for
themselves. But they are exceptions of the narrowest kind. In one
case, government compensation was offered only after victims suc-
cessfully sued a private party. In legislating compensation, the gov-
ernment supplemented the payments of a judgment-proof private
party while making clear its disinterest in compensating victims of ter-
rorism more generally. In the other, compensation followed an ex-
traordinary political engagement between Japan and North Korea,
and involved a highly unusual set of circumstances and a very small
number of victims. Overall, however, one can clearly observe a non-
compensation norm that defines the state's response to natural and
other disasters.
III. DISASTER COMPENSATION IN JAPAN: FUKUSHIMA
Fukushima thus unfolded against a background that strongly sig-
naled the improbability of the government embracing the opportunity
to create a victim compensation scheme. David Edgington observed
two related sentiments in his fine book about the Kobe earthquake:
that government cannot help people to reconstruct their lives, and
that "all Japan[ese] people should be treated equally in the provision
of government services and support. ' 20 However tempting a symbolic
opportunity Fukushima offered to unify the nation in a time of crisis,
and whatever merit there may be to the view that the structure and
function of the Japanese state make disaster compensation plausible,
countervailing qualities-be they a disregard for public welfare, an
overemphasis on fiscal conservatism, a subservience to private inter-
ests, a deep commitment to individual autonomy, or others-clearly
disincline the state to distribute financial compensation.21 Indeed,
even a massive disaster like Fukushima sparked little debate about the
creation of a general compensation program for those whose lives
19. [Aid to Victims Kidnapped by North Korean Authorities], Act No. 143 of 2002 (Japan),
available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H14/H14HO143.html.
20. See EDOINGTON, supra note 11, at 86 (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. See, e.g., David McNeill, The Fukushima Nuclear Crisis and the Fight for Compensation,
ASIA-PAC. J. (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.japanfocus.org/-David-McNeillI3707 (describing the
compensation scheme in place and noting the lack of a government-supported comprehensive
compensation program).
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were affected by the earthquake and tsunami. Unlike 9/11 in the U.S.,
and the prevailing view that victims in the vicinity of the World Trade
Center were especially deserving of government largesse, few in Japan
framed their expressions of sympathy in the language of recompense.
Although the government did not craft a compensation system for
all Fukushima victims, it was forced to deal differently with one par-
ticular group. Those harmed by the nuclear accident, as distinguished
from those whose injuries were caused by the earthquake or tsunami,
are eligible for compensation under legislation that governs the opera-
tion of nuclear power facilities. 22 Similar legislation exists in most in-
dustrialized democracies-the U.S. equivalent is the 1957 Price-
Anderson Act23-but the dearth of nuclear accidents throughout the
world means that such legislation has rarely been invoked.
24
A. The Nuclear Damage Compensation Act
Under the terms of Japan's 1961 Nuclear Damage Compensation
Act (NDCA), private power providers have no-fault responsibility for
nuclear accidents, with liability capped at 120 billion yen. 25 Beyond
that amount, the government may (but is not legally obligated to)
shoulder the cost of compensation. 26 In the aftermath of events in
Fukushima, it was clear that a large number of people had suffered
potentially compensable harms. Less clear was the question of who
22. [Nuclear Damage Compensation Act], Act No. 147 of 1961 (Japan), available at http://
www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislation/japan-docs/Japan-Nuclear-Damage-Compensation-Act.pdf.
Of course, the majority of those who were rendered homeless in Fukushima, or who suffered
injury or death, were affected by the natural disasters, not the nuclear meltdown. However, the
government has no legal obligation to compensate them, and has no plans to do so.
23. Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006).
24. The Price-Anderson Act was in place in 1979 at the time of the Three Mile Island accident
in the United States; however, claims from the accident failed to exceed the required private
liability insurance from which the first claims under the Act are to be paid. Moreover, the acci-
dent was not deemed to be an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence," which would have caused
certain provisions under the Act to come into play. While the Three Mile Island accident was a
serious and tragic event, it was not of a large enough scale to fully test the functionality of the
Price-Anderson Act. See Leslie Lass, Comment, The Price-Anderson Act: If a "Chernobyl" Oc-
curs in the United States, Will the Victims Be Adequately Compensated, 7 GLENDALE L. REV. 200,
200-01 (1985); see also Nuclear Insurance and Disaster Relief Funds, U.S. NRC (June 2011),
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/funds-fs.html.
25. See [Nuclear Damage Compensation Act], Act No. 147 of 1961, §§ 3, 7 (Japan), available
at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislation/japan-docs/Japan-Nuclear-Damage-Compensation-
Act.pdf.
26. Prior to the Fukushima disaster, the NDCA had been triggered only once, in 1999, when a
uranium reprocessing plant operated by a subsidiary of Sumitomo Metal Mining Corporation
malfunctioned, exposing both workers and residents to radiation. See Eri Osaka, Corporate Lia-
bility, Government Liability, and the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, 21 PAc. RIM L. & POL'Y J.
433, 438 (2012).
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was eligible for compensation, which harms were compensable, how
much proof should be required by those requesting compensation,
what administrative structure was best suited to evaluating such proof
and paying claims, and what sorts of obligations should be borne by
claimants who received compensation. The following Parts will ad-
dress these issues in succession.
B. Defining Eligibility
The government's first step in creating an administrative structure
for Fukushima claims, in keeping with the NDCA, was to assemble a
Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensa-
tion. Chaired by Yoshihisa Nomi, a distinguished civil law scholar
from Gakushuiin University, the panel consists of nine additional
members, five of whom are prominent legal experts and four of whom
have expertise in medicine, science, and radiation. The goal of the
committee was to address a question at the heart of all compensation
funds-eligibility.
In certain circumstances, like the 9/11 fund in the US, a simple rule
of proximity is used to determine eligibility, with injuries occurring
within clearly defined geographical parameters deemed eligible and
those beyond the parameters ineligible. 27 Other cases are more diffi-
cult; when determining eligibility under the Deepwater Horizon Dis-
aster Victim Compensation Fund for damage caused by spilled oil, for
example, administrators were confronted with claims from all fifty
states and various foreign countries. 28 Similarly, the huge toll taken
by the Fukushima disaster first required a determination of whether
all victims or only a subset would be eligible for compensation.
Pragmatically, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to offer
more than token compensation if the eligible pool were defined
broadly. Moreover, as already noted, the possibility of an overall
compensation program was never a serious option. Without a general
statute mandating disaster compensation, only those affected by the
nuclear accident would be eligible for compensation.
Even that limitation left a number of unanswered questions. First,
under the terms of the NDCA, nuclear facility operators have strict,
unlimited liability for nuclear accidents unless the accident is caused
by a "grave natural disaster. ' 29 Not surprisingly, the Tokyo Electric
27. See FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 42.
28. Interview with Kenneth Feinberg, Administrator, Deepwater Horizon Disaster Victim
Compensation Fund, in Wash., D.C. (Feb. 6, 2012).
29. [Nuclear Damage Compensation Act], Act No. 147 of 1961, § 3 (Japan), available at http:I/
www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislation/japan-docs/Japan-Nuclear-Damage-Compensation-Act.pdf.
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Power Company (TEPCO) did not wait long to claim that the triple
disaster in Fukushima constituted a "grave natural disaster" and that
it therefore had no liability. That claim appears to have had little trac-
tion with the government, which has proceeded as if liability rests with
TEPCO and not the government. 30
Second, the NDCA anticipates that funds for compensation will be
raised in one of two ways: through mandatory insurance (insurers are
released from liability when accidents are caused by earthquakes or
other natural disasters) or through an indemnity contract between the
government and the nuclear power provider.31 With the insurer re-
leased from liability, Fukushima victims would receive compensation
from TEPCO with funds collected by way of the indemnity contract.
The third question left open by the NDCA is how to handle com-
pensation payments once the 120 billion yen reserve mandated by the
NDCA is depleted. Here, the NDCA is profoundly ambiguous. Sec-
tion 16 states: "[W]hen the actual amount which he should pay for the
nuclear damage pursuant to Section 3 exceeds the financial security
amount and when the Government deems it necessary in order to at-
tain the objectives of this act," the government will give the nuclear
operator "such aid as is required for him to compensate the dam-
age."'32 With estimates that the cost of compensation in Fukushima
could cost trillions of yen, this provision left the government with a set
of distasteful alternatives: (1) refuse to provide additional cash to
TEPCO, forcing the company into bankruptcy and potentially shut-
ting out many claimants; (2) take over the task of compensating
Fukushima victims; or (3) provide money to TEPCO and require that
the funds be repaid. Fearing the impact of bankruptcy on Japan's
struggling economy and wanting to distance itself from direct pay-
ments to victims, 33 in May 2011 the government announced a frame-
work to provide financial support to TEPCO. 34 Under the plan, the
30. Masayuki Murayama, There Are Few Cases Around Here: Lawyers' Response to Nuclear
Compensation and Structural Problems of the Japanese Legal Profession (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author).
31. See [Nuclear Damage Compensation Act], Act No. 147 of 1961 (Japan), available at http://
www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislation/japan-docs/Japan-Nuclear-Damage-Compensation-Act.pdf.
32. Id. § 16 (emphasis added). Section 3 of this Act addresses government payments if there
is an exoneration for a grave natural disaster. See id. § 3.
33. With foreign investment in TEPCO bonds, bankruptcy would unsettle an already weak
investment climate, and taking control of the compensation system would imply an undesired
degree of state responsibility for the accident.
34. See X. Vdsquez-Maignan, Fukushima: Liability and Compensation, NEA NEWS (2011),
http://www.oecd-nea.org/nea-news/2011/29-2/nea-news-29-2-fukushima-e.pdf. The Diet ap-
proved the plan in August 2011. See Cody Harding, Japan Lawmakers Approved Fukushima
Victim Compensation Plan, JURIST (Aug. 3, 2012), http://jurist.org/thisday/2012/08/japan-
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Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation issued gov-
ernment bonds that enabled it to provide funds to TEPCO.35 In re-
turn, TEPCO must repay the government, cut its costs, and improve
the Fukushima compensation procedures. 36 This structure leaves both
TEPCO and the government in an awkward position. The govern-
ment has no legal obligation to fund TEPCO's compensation fund be-
yond its 120 billion yen indemnity agreement, but it considers
propping up TEPCO to be a better alternative than taking over the
compensation process and paying victims directly. TEPCO, which has
long enjoyed a cozy relationship with regulators, survives as a private
company, but must run a complex and expensive compensation pro-
gram for victims of a nuclear accident who blame the company for
their harms and believe that its key incentive is to pay as little com-
pensation as possible.
Finally, the question of which types of victims would be compen-
sated had to be addressed. The government's August 2011 prelimi-
nary compensation guidelines, for example, focused on emergency
compensation payments to those who were subject to official orders in
the wake of the nuclear accident. 37 This included people whose harms
were caused by mandatory evacuation from areas within twenty kilo-
meters of the plant (approximately 60,000 people), the prohibition of
navigation and flight in designated areas, limitations on the sale of
certain products, negative publicity that caused a drop in commodity
lawmakers-approve-fukushima-victim-compensation-plan.php; see also Takashi Hirokawa &
Sachiko Sakamaki, Japan to Help TEPCO Pay Nuclear Claims; Banks May Have to Write Off
Debt, BLOOMBERG (May 13, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-13/japan-to-sup-
port-tepco-compensation.html (explaining that the Japanese government had decided to step in
and provide aid to TEPCO, but that TEPCO would still be unlimitedly liable for damages).
35. Visquez-Maignan, supra note 34, at 11.
36. A Japanese newspaper described the process as follows:
TEPCO has requested a total of 1.01 trillion yen of financial assistance for the time
being, including 120 billion yen in government compensation to be paid over the nu-
clear accident under the nuclear damage compensation law.
The funding entity, the Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund, is designed to
support TEPCO by receiving funds through a special type of government bond that will
carry no interest and can be cashed in when necessary, in addition to annual contribu-
tions from all utilities operating nuclear plants in Japan.
TEPCO is obligated to eventually repay the funds provided by the body.
Gov't OKs Plan to Provide 900 Bil. Yen Financial Aid to TEPCO, KYoDo NEWS INT'L, INC.,
Nov. 4, 2011, available at http://www.thefreelibrary.comlGov%27t+OKs+plan+to+provide+900+
bil.+yen+financial+aid+to+TEPCO.-a0271825437; see also Vfsquez-Maignan, supra note 34, at
11.
37. Midterm Guidelines, Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensa-
tion (Aug. 2011). Although the government's Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear
Damage has established guidelines for compensation, requests for compensation are submitted
directly to TEPCO and the ultimate decisions regarding compensation lie with TEPCO.
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prices, and more. In essence, those affected by state mandates were
eligible for compensation, while others were not.
Not surprisingly, using mandates as the determinant of eligibility
provoked those who were excluded, particularly people living beyond
the mandatory evacuation zone. Those living between twenty and
thirty kilometers from the Fukushima plant, for example, were ad-
vised by the government to prepare for evacuation, but were not re-
quired to evacuate. Yet many of them, particularly families with
children, left their homes and relocated to temporary shelters. In
their view, they had suffered harms identical to those within the
twenty-kilometer zone and should therefore be similarly compen-
sated. Bowing to pressure, in December 2011, the Dispute Reconcili-
ation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation supplemented
its preliminary guidelines with a recommendation that voluntary evac-
uees in twenty-three municipalities also be compensated, adding an
estimated 1.5 million people to the compensation-eligible pool.
38
C. Defining Compensable Harms
Deciding who is eligible for compensation is one critical step, but
equally important is the need to define compensable harms by distin-
guishing between losses closely linked to the nuclear accident and
those that are distant and attenuated. Directly implicating scholarly
debates about proximate cause, that determination is as much a mat-
ter of social policy as of legal doctrine. 39 Claims from overseas fishing
net manufacturers who sought compensation from the Deepwater Ho-
rizon Fund for their economic loss, for example, or from students in
adjacent buildings at Virginia Tech who sought compensation for
emotional distress, underscore the difficultly of deciding which harms
are compensable and which are not.
It is easy to imagine the wide range of harms plausibly attributed to
the Fukushima nuclear disaster for which people may seek compensa-
tion-the economic loss suffered by farmers and fishermen, the drop
in revenue experienced by tourist attractions in the Fukushima area,
the emotional distress felt by those exposed to radiation, and much
more. In deciding which harms will trigger payment, the challenge for
38. Gov't Panel Sets N-Payment Scope, Amounts, DAILY YOMIURI ONLINE (Dec. 8, 2011),
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/nationalIT11207005778.htm.
39. Following German law, Japanese legal scholars generally frame the debate as implicating a
distinction between direct and indirect harm. As one legal expert on the committee put it, if a
fisherman suffers harm because radiation prevents him from fishing, it is direct and compensa-
ble; if a net maker suffers harm, it is indirect and not compensable. Early common law cases
relied upon a similar distinction. See, e.g., In re Polemis, [1921] 3 K.B. 560 (A.C.) (Eng.); Over-
seas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co. (Wagon Mound 1), [1961] A.C. 388 (J.C.).
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the government and TEPCO has been to articulate legally, politically,
and ethically defensible lines between compensable and noncompen-
sable injuries.
The long latency period typical in toxic chemical exposure cases
presents one particularly difficult dilemma. In legal conflicts like that
surrounding Agent Orange, the majority of claims centered on the
possibility of future health harms to those who were exposed to the
chemical defoliant, but had not yet suffered any ill effects.40 In
Fukushima, similarly, many residents and workers were exposed to
elevated levels of radiation, but few have experienced any negative
health consequences. Some of those exposed will surely worry about
the increased risk of getting various types of cancers, and a few will
develop radiation-related diseases they would not have otherwise con-
tracted.41 Yet in most cases it will be impossible to know whether an
individual cancer or disease was caused by Fukushima-related radia-
tion or had an alternative cause. Whether to compensate those who
may get sick, what to do about the impossibility of identifying the
cause of future cases of cancer, and how to handle the harms resulting
from anxiety about one's future health are all implicated in the effort
to define compensable harms.
The most widespread harm resulting from Fukushima, suggested by
the worry associated with latent disease, is emotional distress. The
national trauma associated with the events in Fukushima makes it par-
ticularly difficult to determine who should be eligible for emotional
distress compensation and what degree of emotional distress justifies
compensation. Initially, only those who were forced to evacuate were
eligible to receive payments for emotional harms. A standardized
amount of 100,000 yen per person, per month was available for six
months, dropping to 50,000 yen per month thereafter.42 Complaints
about the decrease in the monthly payment led TEPCO to keep pay-
ments at the 100,000 yen level, but that too was controversial, with
some lawyers pointing out that tort judgments that included awards
for emotional harm generally exceeded the cap set by TEPCO. Be-
cause many Fukushima victims relied upon emotional distress pay-
40. See generally Kenneth R. Feinberg, Reporting from the Front Line-One Mediator's Expe-
rience with Mass Torts, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 359, 368 (1998) (describing the problems associated
with latent future claims in the Agent Orange Litigation).
41. Recent estimates suggest that there will be relatively few cancers or other serious illnesses
caused by the radiation that leaked from the Fukushima nuclear power plants. Geoff Brumfiel,
Fukushima's Doses Tallied, NATURE (May 23, 2012), http://www.nature.com/news/fukushima-s-
doses-tallied-1.10686.
42. Daniel H. Foote, Japan's ADR System for Resolving Nuclear Power-Related Damage
Disputes 10 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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ments as their only source of income, the stipend level was of critical
importance. Only in June 2012 did voluntary evacuees become eligi-
ble to receive compensation for their emotional distress, with the
amount capped at 200,000 yen per person.43
In many cases, payments for property damage are of even greater
financial importance than emotional distress payments. Tens of
thousands of people were displaced by the nuclear accident 44 and, per-
haps without exception, the value of their land has decreased precip-
itously. Some may never be able to return home due to radiation
contamination, whereas others may not want to return to their homes
out of fear of radiation, a preference to leave the Fukushima region,
or for other reasons. Moreover, in cases in which property is not usea-
ble for the foreseeable future, it is unclear whether those who are
compensated for its full value will continue to own the property or will
be obligated to clean it up in the future.45
The magnitude of the costs associated with property damage and
the difficulty of determining its fair value led TEPCO to sidestep the
issue of property compensation for many months. Finally, in March
2012, the government's advisory committee on compensation an-
nounced guidelines for handling property damage. 46 The guidelines
divided the area around the nuclear plant into three regions: (1)
where radiation levels of fifty or more millisieverts per year (ms/year)
make property uninhabitable for five or more years; (2) where levels
of between twenty and fifty ms/year mean that property is unlikely to
be useable for between 1 and 5 years; and (3) where radiation levels of
less than twenty ms/year suggest that property will be inhabitable
within a year.47 Implied in this scheme is that compensation payments
43. See Press Release, TEPCO, Start of Compensation Payouts for the Voluntary Evacuees
from Southern Fukushima Prefecture (June 11, 2012), available at http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/
press/corp-comlrelease/20121205326_1870.html.
44. See Matt Smith, Radioactive Levels Staying High off Fukushima Daiichi in Japan, CNN
(Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/25/world/asia/japan-fukushima/index.html.
45. A lawsuit brought by the private owners of a golf course against TEPCO signals the de-
gree of confusion about such issues. In that case, the owners of Sunfield Golf Club sought to
impose the cost of radiation decontamination on TEPCO. TEPCO successfully defended the
claim, arguing in part that it was not liable because TEPCO no longer owned the radioactive
particles, which were now covering the ground and thus the property of Sunfield. Cf Fukushima
Golf Course Lawsuit Against TEPCO Dismissed, MAJIROX NEWS (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.
majiroxnews.com/2011/11/14/fukushima-golf-course-lawsuit-against-tepco-dismissed.
46. See McNeill, supra note 21.
47. Second Supplement to Interim Guidelines on Determination of the Scope of Nuclear Dam-
age Resulting from the Accident at the Tokyo Electric Power Company Fukushima Daiichi and
Daini Nuclear Power Plants, in ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., JAPAN'S COMPENSA-
TION SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGES 173, 174 (2012), available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/
law/fukushima/7089-fukushima-compensation-system-pp.pdf.
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can be scaled to the level of radiation found in different locations,
with the possibility of a lump sum buyout payment to those whose
property has radiation in the 50 or more ms/year range. So far, there
have been no official estimates of the cost of fully compensating those
unable to return to their homes, but it is clear that compensation pay-
ments for property-related losses will be extremely costly.
Another high-cost category of harm resulting from the Fukushima
nuclear accident is the financial loss suffered by farmers who had to
destroy their crops or were unable to find buyers for their products.
Formerly a highly productive agricultural area, the value of produce
and grain grown in the vicinity of Fukushima plummeted after radia-
tion levels increased.48 The government's compensation guidelines
addressed these losses directly, specifying that compensation would be
offered to both those who were prohibited by government policy from
growing or selling certain crops as well as those whose ability to sell
their products was affected by rumors of radiation contamination and
a corresponding loss of reputation.
Much has been said in the academic literature about the political
ties between Japan's agricultural cooperatives and the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party (LDP), and how the cozy relationship between them helps
to explain both the LDP's long-standing postwar electoral success and
the many subsidies and benefits enjoyed by farmers. 49 That political
dynamic has clearly changed with the waning power of the LDP and
the shrinking of the agricultural sector. 50 But judging from the ability
of farmers to mobilize in the aftermath of Fukushima, at least some of
the agriculture sector's political clout appears to be intact. Rather
than pursue compensation individually, 100,000 farmers aggregated
their claims through their umbrella organization, Central Union of
Agricultural Cooperatives, or JA-Zenchu (JA) and hired an extremely
powerful and politically effective attorney. Representing seventeen
regional JAs and directly negotiating with TEPCO, the attorney had
(as of March 2012) obtained almost $1.5 billion for his clients.51 Those
funds are considered short-term, temporary outlays and do not in-
clude the cost of decontamination or loss of use of land. Coupled with
the recent lowering of national radiation exposure standards, those
uncompensated loses suggest that farmers will be seeking much more
48. Interview with Hideaki Kubori, in Tokyo, Japan (Mar. 8, 2012).
49. See, e.g., AURELIA GEORGE MULGAN, THE POLITICS OF AGRICULTURE IN JAPAN 37-38
(2000).
50. See Aurelia George Mulgan, Where Tradition Meets Change: Japan's Agricultural Politics
in Transition, 31 J. JAPANESE STUD. 261, 261 (2005).
51. Interview with Hideaki Kubori, supra note 48. $1.5 billion is roughly equal to 1100 oku
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compensation in the future. In contrast to those in the fishing indus-
try, who also suffered significant financial damage but are not as polit-
ically connected or organized, farmers are well positioned to prevail in
their effort to obtain recompense.
The compensable harms discussed thus far involve victims who
were subject to some form of government mandate-inhabitants
forced to evacuate or farmers prohibited from selling their crops, for
example. But there are of course many others in the Fukushima re-
gion who were affected by the nuclear accident and have sought com-
pensation. Under the government's first set of guidelines no
compensation was available for such parties. When those guidelines
were updated in December 2011, however, individuals who evacuated
their homes voluntarily became eligible for payments to compensate
emotional distress and increased living expenses. 52 Initial, temporary
payments covering the time from the accident until December 31,
2011 were capped at 400,000 yen for children and pregnant women,
and 80,000 yen for others.53 Those seeking compensation for evacua-
tion costs and business losses were left to petition TEPCO on an indi-
vidual basis.
D. Proof
Determining the pool of compensation-eligible claimants and iden-
tifying the types of compensable harms is critical to the creation of a
compensation scheme; so too is deciding upon the kind of evidence
that must be submitted in order to obtain compensation. What bur-
den must those who believe they are eligible for compensation bear in
showing a causal link between the nuclear meltdown and their harms?
What documentation must they provide to convince administrators
that their alleged loses are real?
Fukushima raises complicated questions of causation that resist
easy solution. A decline in business at a local hot spring resort, for
example, may be explained by the fear that potential patrons have of
radiation. But the decline may also be the result of the sluggish econ-
omy and signal an overall change in how people are spending their
leisure time. Even more generally, disentangling the effects of the
earthquake, the tsunami, and the nuclear accident can be exceedingly
difficult. How can one assess the relative causal weight of each of
those factors when evaluating something like emotional distress?
52. TEPCO Ups Payout for Some Evacuees, DAILY YOMIURI ONLINE (Mar. 1, 2012), http://
www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/nationarlT120229004312.htm.
53. Id. In February 2012, the cap for children and pregnant women increased to 600,000 yen.
See id.
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Cautioned by the August 2011 interim guidelines, which advised
TEPCO to treat causation as more art than science, compensation ad-
ministrators appear to be steering clear of explicit conflicts over cau-
sation by treating them as part of the discussion of eligibility.
When it comes to proof, the focus is instead on the seemingly more
mechanical task of providing documentation to support one's claims.
Even there complications can arise. In the aftermath of the Deepwa-
ter Horizon oil spill, some claimants who sought compensation for lost
income were only able to proffer a fishing license as proof of their
loss. 54 Similarly, although the interim guidelines counseled TEPCO to
relax formal evidentiary standards when it was "necessary and reason-
able" to do so, some Fukushima claimants, their homes leveled by the
earthquake, washed away by the tsunami, or otherwise uninhabitable,
have complained that the requirement to submit original documents
to demonstrate financial loss was an unreasonable burden. Eviden-
tiary standards in such cases have sometimes been relaxed, but ques-
tions remain about how to assess lost income, property damage, and
other losses in the absence of good documentation.
E. Infrastructure
Defining the eligible class of claimants, the range of compensable
harms, and the proof required to demonstrate harms all raise difficult
legal, ethical, and policy questions. They are also all dependent upon
an equally challenging task; creating the necessary administrative
structure for evaluating claims and tendering payments has raised the
most vexing issues. Through what process, for. example, can one apply
for compensation? Who evaluates claims? How can one ensure that
similarly situated claimants will receive similar awards? As in most
legal institutions, the goals here include efficiency, effectiveness,
transparency, accountability, and justice. But how to achieve them is
not at all clear.
Rather than set up a unitary compensation system for all possible
claims and claimants, Fukushima victims can follow three separate
routes. The largest-run by TEPCO and staffed by over 10,000 peo-
ple, including 3,000 TEPCO employees and several hundred attor-
neys 55-is known as the direct route to compensation. Largely
adhering to the guidelines of the Dispute Reconciliation Committee
for Nuclear Damage Compensation, this approach to compensation is
meant to address the majority of losses caused by the nuclear acci-
54. Interview with Kenneth Feinberg, supra note 28.
55. The data in this Part were current as of spring, 2012.
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dent. Although payments under this approach are meant to be stan-
dardized, the guidelines generally suggest a range rather than a
precise amount, leaving TEPCO a good deal of discretion in its deter-
mination of compensation awards. As of March 2012, TEPCO had
paid 25,700 claims to individuals and 21,400 to corporations through
this process.. There were approximately 10,000 pending claims.
Why have relatively few of the 150,000 evacuees sought compensa-
tion thus far? Among the explanations is the cumbersome application
process that initially required the submission of a sixty-page claim
form, which was cut back to thirty-four pages after an initial outcry
about its length.56 No electronic filing of claims is permitted, which
can make it difficult for some victims to submit their forms.57 In addi-
tion, some evacuees and affected businesses have stated that they re-
fuse to engage with TEPCO, whom they blame for the nuclear
accident; that the compensation amounts being offered are too mea-
ger and not worth seeking; and that there are too few compensable
categories. 58 A tourism resort that experienced a drop in business, for
example, can potentially be compensated for bookings cancelled
before May 31, 2011, the day on which the travel ban to the
Fukushima area was lifted. But neither cancellations after that date
nor a decrease in the volume of bookings are compensable.
Because the Committee's guidelines for "direct" compensation ad-
dress the most common types of claims, but do not cover all victims or
losses, the government and TEPCO set up a second route to compen-
sation under the supervision of the Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology. Called the Center for Nuclear Dam-
age Reconciliation, this part of the compensation system is headed by
High Court Judge Hiroshi Noyama and controlled by attorney-
mediators commissioned by the Japanese government and seconded
by the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA) to adjudicate
claims. In contrast to "direct" compensation, this second approach
has come to be known as alternative dispute resolution (ADR), al-
though unlike most ADR it is not an alternative to litigation, but
rather an alternative to a form of compensation that is itself a type of
ADR.
Modeled on the United Nation's Compensation Commission for
Iraq,59 the ADR system has been used to compensate specific catego-
ries of people, such as young children and pregnant women, as well as
56. Osaka, supra note 26, at 441.
57. Id.
58. I obtained this information during a research trip to Tokyo in March 2012.
59. Foote, supra note 42, at 6.
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for categories of damages not clearly addressed by the guidelines.
Approximately 20% of claimants using ADR have hired attorneys,
who generally charge a 10,000 yen retainer and receive 5% of the
value of the award. Although class action claims do not exist in Japan,
some attorneys have been able to bundle multiple cases into a single
action; one such action includes 130 evacuees seeking compensation
for the cost of evacuation, lost wages, and emotional distress. An-
other suit brought together thirty-three people negotiating for prop-
erty damage payments.
One of the first cases resolved through ADR hints at how the pro-
cess operates. The claimant lived five kilometers from the Fukushima
nuclear power plant, and because she was unable to return to her
home she sought compensation for property loss. No compensation
was available through the "direct" process; TEPCO's view was that
because high levels of radiation made it impossible to inspect her
home compensation was premature. The claimant brought her claim
through ADR, seeking payment for the value of her home, personal
effects, and emotional distress. ADR mediators set the award for
property damage at 50% of the most recent tax assessment, leading to
speculation that future awards for property damage might take a simi-
lar approach. 60
The ADR route to compensation has encountered a number of pro-
cedural difficulties. Initially, the hope was that all claims would be
reviewed by a panel of three mediators, but with hundreds of cases
filed each month and a growing backlog of cases, mediators have been
left to evaluate claims on their own.61 Similarly, what was supposed to
be an extremely quick process lasting less than three months has be-
come increasingly slow, and the fact that proceedings are conducted
behind closed doors with little transparency limits their precedential
value.62 Mediators worry about inconsistency and try to avoid it
through internal case discussions, but it remains difficult for those
outside of the process to predict how potential claims will be settled.
Because the resolution of ADR cases requires TEPCO's assent,
some lawyers have suggested that it is faster and more profitable to
sidestep ADR and utilize a third approach to obtaining compensa-
60. Interview with Junichiro Makita, Attorney at Law, Harago & Partners Law Offices, in
Tokyo, Japan (Mar. 8, 2012).
61. Chico Harlan, Nuclear Redress Will Never Approximate Losses, JAPAN TIMES (June 27,
2012), http://aws.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/06/27/news/nuclear-redress-will-never-approximate-
losses. There were 200-300 new cases filed every month as of March 2012, and a backlog of
roughly 1,100 cases. The pace of filings has continued to accelerate.
62. Parties are permitted to publicize the results of their claims, and the law stipulates that the
ADR center may publicize the outcome of "important" cases.
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tion-litigation. Suing TEPCO is an available option for all affected
parties, both individuals and corporations, and one might think that it
would be an attractive option given the emerging evidence of poten-
tial carelessness in managing the nuclear reactors. 63 But judging from
the small number of cases that have been publicized, parties may have
concluded that "direct" compensation and ADR are the better ap-
proaches. 64 In fact, nothing precludes the possibility of parties pursu-
ing multiple routes to compensation. One can simultaneously bring a
claim directly to TEPCO, file through ADR, and litigate. It is difficult
to know whether parties are pursuing the first two routes concur-
rently, but at least at this point in time they do not appear to see
litigation as an attractive option.65
For all Fukushima victims, finding legal representation appears to
be a challenge. Attorneys are unevenly distributed in Japan, with half
of all practicing lawyers located in Tokyo and very few in rural areas
like Fukushima.66 Believing that there was unmet demand in
Fukushima and that outreach to potential clients in shelters was nec-
essary, some lawyers in the Tokyo area (particularly those with an in-
clination to public service) travelled to Fukushima to offer their
services. 67 They were quickly rebuffed by the local bar association,
which did not want lawyers from outside the area to set up regional
offices and argued that there was no unmet demand for legal services
to justify their presence. The clash between local and outside attor-
neys may have been in part about legal fees, but it was primarily a
conflict of legal cultures. With the more entrepreneurial Tokyo law-
yers wanting to seek out clients and the rural Fukushima lawyers argu-
ing that such an approach was unprofessional, their disagreement
could only be resolved by appeal to the JFBA and the courts, a pro-
cess that would be time-consuming and contentious. 68 Consequently,
63. Malcolm Grimston, Viewpoint: Can Japan Learn Lessons from the Fukushima Disaster,
BBC NEWS (July 6, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18728421 (noting that a "string
of errors" and "willful negligence" left TEPCO's Fukushima plant unprepared for the nuclear
disaster).
64. Chico Harlan, Japan's Nuclear Crisis Victims Left Few Options for Compensation, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 1, 2012, at A4 (noting the "dearth" of lawsuits filed in the wake of the nuclear
disaster).
65. Id.
66. Norimitsu Onishi, Lawyers in Rural Japan: Low Supply, Iffy Demand, N.Y. TiMES, July
29, 2008, at A10 ("[H]alf of Japan's lawyers are concentrated in Tokyo, leaving only one lawyer
for every 30,000 Japanese outside the capital .... ").
67. See Robert B. Leflar et al., Human Flotsam, Legal Fallout: Japan's Tsunami and Nuclear
Meltdown, 27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIo. 107, 115 (2012).
68. Legally, Tokyo lawyers practicing in Fukushima are required to register with the local bar,
* and the Fukushima bar can keep them out if they are deemed "inappropriate." With the
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the Tokyo lawyers returned home and the Fukushima victims were
left to rely primarily on local counsel.69
Finally, one additional factor further complicates the process of vic-
tim compensation. For more than a year, TEPCO's emphasis was on
temporary, serial awards rather than on lump sum payments. The re-
sult was that victims were unable to tender their claims, receive com-
pensation, and get on with their lives. Instead, they were pulled into a
cycle of claiming and compensation, with little end in sight. The logic
of temporary payments is clear-the nuclear disaster is still unfolding,
evacuee costs remain uncertain, business losses are ongoing, property
damage is difficult to assess, and lost wages are mounting. But that
logic is only part of the reason for the failure to offer single, final
payments. Equally if not more important is the fact that TEPCO
oversees all aspects of the compensation process and lump sum pay-
ments to victims would exact a huge financial cost on the company
(and, by extension, on the government). It is better to bear the in-
creased administrative costs of the compensation program than to pay
out a large amount of money up front, especially because at least
some victims will inevitably give up rather than continue to file com-
pensation claims.
F. Claimant Responsibility
Most compensation schemes impose obligations on victims. Often,
at least in the U.S., claimants are given the option of either accepting
or rejecting a compensation offer. If they accept it, they give up the
right to litigate, whereas rejecting the offer enables them to sue. The
first draft of the Fukushima compensation guidelines included a simi-
lar provision, which was met with immediate opposition.70 The provi-
sion was abandoned and Fukushima claimants obtained the right to
simultaneously pursue multiple avenues to compensation. A claimant
may seek and be awarded "direct" payments, for example, and then
use the funds to hire a lawyer to sue TEPCO. Presumably, there will
be offsets so that compensation is tendered from only one source for
any given loss. But it is nonetheless unusual that claimants in
Fukushima are under few constraints when it comes to bringing their
disputes through different channels.
Fukushima bar threatening to take the case first to the JFBA and then up to the Supreme Court
of Japan, a resolution would take considerable time.
69. Recently a Tokyo firm was allowed to, and did, set up an office in Fukushima.
70. Murayama, supra note 30.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Fukushima compensation process is still in the early stages, so
it is premature to reach any hard and fast conclusions. Provisionally,
however, a few general comments are in order. First, the approach to
compensation in Fukushima is consonant with the general norm that
governs disaster compensation in Japan: compensate if the law re-
quires, but not otherwise; compensate symbolically, but not enough to
truly cover losses; compensate uniformly, but not tailored to individ-
ual loss.
Second, the architecture of the compensation system makes it ex-
tremely difficult for potential claimants to figure out which route to
payment is most appropriate to their losses and needs. Because the
legislation leaves those most directly responsible for the accident-the
nuclear power industry-in charge of meting out payments, the com-
pensation process is ad hoc and deeply political. Key decisions about
eligibility have been made behind closed doors by committees of elites
that lack transparency or accountability. The result is an extremely
unwieldy and expensive administrative structure that impedes rather
than facilitates compensation, fueling the view that the needs of the
government and TEPCO, not the needs of victims, predominate.
Third and most generally, as politicians, the energy industry, attor-
neys, and activists debate the design of the Fukushima compensation
system, it is clear that the needs of victims are not being met. Evacua-
tion centers are full of individuals and families who are unable to re-
turn to their contaminated homes, but lack the financial means to start
new lives elsewhere. Widespread emotional trauma has been largely
untreated. Those who have received compensation have generally
been awarded only small, temporary payments. Energy rate hikes and
nuclear plant restarts have dominated the news, while the needs of the
Fukushima victims have receded into the background. When seen
through the lens of access to justice that Marc Galanter has so impor-
tantly emphasized, it is clear that much remains to be accomplished in
Japan's northern provinces.
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